Иван Янев
Външната политика на България през Втората световна война в българската историческа литература (8) (1938–1944 г.)

BULGARIA’S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AS REFLECTED IN BULGARIAN HISTORIC LITERATURE
1938–1944
DR. Ivan Yanev
Summary

This research encompasses a large volume of historic literature. The goal I set myself is to cover if not the whole, at least a more significant part of the historic literature related to Bulgaria’s foreign policy on the eve of and during the Second World War. Research, diaries and memoirs of politicians from the time of the war have also been examined in this treatise. I remained true to the theory that every rule has its exception, and for this reason I have included some materials from the Gold Fund of the Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) which were given to me to study and cite. Those materials are kept in audio versions in the Gold Fund of the BNR, but when I asked to be given these recordings to include in the form of an audio annex to the book, I was given a flat refusal. I hope that the time will come when such historic evidence will not only be looked on for commercial purposes but will be given to researchers for the enrichment of the study of history. I have also included in this research collections of documents which have already been published and are part of Bulgaria’s historic literature. The discussion of Bulgarian foreign policy during the war years in foreign language historic literature presents a different approach and a separate research and for that reason this presentation is baed solely on Bulgarian historic literature.

This work covers historic literature which was created over the course of several decades. As is often the case, the shorter the distance in time from the described events, the more emotional their interpretation is. After the war, when Bulgaria was in the Soviet orbit, the prevailing interpretation of facts in historiography was one that created a favorable impression of the role of communism and of the USSR. The first attempts at a more general treatment of events in the first years of the war are two articles written by Mirin Mihov, „The Struggle by the USSR and Bulgaria for Peace in the Balkans at the Beginning of the Second World War“ and „The Struggle of the USSR to Prevent Nazi Aggression in the Balkans during the Second World War“, published in 1953 and 1954 respectively. They are full of inaccurate interpretations of events, but at the same time they are the first attempt to make clear the Bulgarian status quo. Mihov writes in an exceptionally pro-Party tone and overstates the positive role of the USSR, but this is understandable given the time the articles were published. The case is also similar in volume 2 of „The History of Bulgaria“ published in 1955. The authors rely more on the pro-Party line than on an historic perspective. In volume 3 of „The History of Bulgaria“ published 9 years later, this approach is maintained. What is changed is the evaluation of Stalin’s role in the years during the war. He is already pointed to as the one to blame for the quick and easy entry of the Wermacht deep into the territory of the USSR. This position was dictated by the process of de-Stalinization undertaken by Nikita Khrushchov at the 20th and 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), rather than by a professional historic approach to the facts.

The two studies written by Nikolay Genchev at the end of the 1960’s, „The Foreign Political Orientation of Bulgaria on the Eve of the Second World War — September 1938 — September 1939“ and „Bulgaria’s Foreign Policy in the Initial Period of the Second World War 1939–1941“ mark a turning point in Bulgarian historiography with respect to the Second World War. Genchev makes an attempt to leave the narrow Party line and keep to the historic approach. In the 1970’s, a significant change took place in Bulgarian historic writing concerning the Second World War. At that time, a number of studies appeared in which a more factual, historic tone prevails, and the number of pro-Party clichés decreases, although not totally eliminated. The following monographs appeared: „Bulgaria and the Third Reich 1941–1944“ by Vitka Toshkova; „Political Relations between Bulgaria and Italy 1922–1943“ by Ilcho Dimitrov; and „Bulgaria’s Foreign Policy 1938–1941“ by Dimitar Sirkov.

In the 1980’s, the less doctrinaire approach to analyzing Bulgarian foreign policy during the war continued to produce good results. The following books were published: „England and Bulgaria 1938–1941“ by Ilcho Dimitrov; „Relations Between Bulgaria and Germany 1931–1939“ by Georgi Markov; „The USA’s Policy towards Bulgaria in the Balkans 1939–1944“ by Vitka Toshkova; and „Diplomatic Relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union 1934–1944“ by Lyudmil Spasov.

After 1989, the pro-Party rhetoric ceased abruptly, but in some historic works it was replaced by its equally unprofessional opposite — the anti-Communist tone. After the change that took place in 1989, a number of diaries and memoirs dating from the late 1930’s to the middle of the 1940’s were published. One of the most important sources on Bulgarian foreign policy is Bogdan Filov’s diary which was published surprisingly even before 1989. Important works published in the 1990’s include the diaries of Parvan Draganov, Evdokia Filova, Lyubomir Lulchev, Georgi Dimitrov and General Nikola Mihov. Many memoirs were also published, among which Stoicho Moshanov’s and Konstantin Muraviev’s stand out.

The goal of the present research is to show Bulgaria’s foreign policy as reflected in Bulgarian historic literature. It is an attempt to show the way the different historic works treat historic events depending on the time they were written. In comparing contradictory historic works, priority is given to the historic truth. The presentation starts with the events which took place one year before the official outbreak of the Second World War. The basic idea is to follow events to the end of the war when Bulgaria enters the conflict. The initial date chosen is July 31, 1938, the date of the signing of the Thessaloniki Agreement when Bulgaria could finally breath after the hardships imposed on it by the 1919 Neuilly Treaty. This treaty cost Bulgaria dearly by the loss of its age-old lands and demands for stiff reparations. This treaty resulted in negative feelings on the part of the Bulgarian population toward the victorious countries of the First World War. This research covers the period to October 28, 1944, when the armistice between Bulgaria and the anti-Nazi coalition was signed in Moscow. It was after dramatic internal political change that took place on September 9, 1944, that Bulgaria moved towards close cooperation with the USSR and to participate in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Bulgaria’s position was officially acknowledged by the victorious countries with the signing of the Moscow armistice.

The structure of this book consists of four chapters defined on a thematic and on a chronological principle. The first chapter encompasses the period from July 31, 1938, to the outbreak of the war. The second chapter is dedicated to the period from the beginning of the war until Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact. The third chapter examines the events from March 1, 1941, to the summer of 1943 when the course of the war began to turn. The last chapter is on Bulgarian foreign policy in the year when the country was governed by a council of regents and by governments that had difficulty finding their way in the tumultuous international situation. I leave it to the readers of this book to make an assessment as to whether the stated goals have been achieved and whether I have managed to delineate impartially the foreign policy of Bulgaria during the Second World War presented on the pages of Bulgarian historic literature.

Great Britain should undoubtedly be rendered its due for the Thessaloniki Agreement. London wanted to set up an agreement on the Balkans to which Bulgaria would also be a part. But there were territorial arguments between Bulgaria and its neighbours which were difficult to solve. The revision of the nightmarish Versailles system began, and the basic catalyst for the changes was a new Germany governed by a new ideology — Nazism and its leader, Adolph Hitler. In March 1938, Germany annexed Austria and turned it into a province of the Third Reich. In the end of September 1938, Germany detached the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia and annexed it to its territory with the consent of the victorious countries of the First World War — France, England and Italy. The British and the French hoped strongly that the new dictator had been satisfied, but they were soon to find out that Hitler would not be moderated by constant concessions made at the expense of small countries. In the middle of March 1939, Germany managed to take the upper hand over Czechoslovakia as well. When Bonito Mussolini learned of this, he accepted the fact quite unhappily since he considered himself the architect of the September 1938 Munich Agreement. This agreement had been breached with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Mussolini restored the balance between Rome and Berlin after Italy occupied the territory of Albania at the beginning of April 1939. The war was approaching, and we can say that it was a reality. Yet, to make war one needs countries at war, and at that time there were no such countries since the British and French allies were constantly giving way to the German dictator. Bulgaria fondly watched the German actions because it was also looking for a solution to it revanchist aspirations. The Kyoseivanov Government defined the foreign political goals of the country. Its primary objective was to take back South Dobrudzha, the border in Thrace from 1913, and eventually to take back the Western outlying districts. Sofia watched hopefully at the failure of the Versailles Treaty but did not dare to undertake any real actions towards solving its territorial problems. It understood that its neighbors would not hesitate to punish it severely if it made one wrong move. Bulgaria’s foreign policy had to be neutral, or at least it had to be suggested in international circles that Bulgaria was leading a policy of non-engagement. There is no doubt that the strings of Sofia’s foreign policy were pulled by Tsar Boris III, but Prime Minister Georgi Kyoseivanov, who was experienced in diplomacy, should also be given credit for the neutral policy. By the summer of 1939, Bulgaria showed that at that moment it had no intention of getting involved with any of the Great Powers. Sofia secretly fully supported the German moves because it hoped for a revision of its own borders, and it is clear that it could get support from Berlin. Prime Minister Kyoseivanov made a visit to Germany at the beginning of July. Even before Kyoseivanov returned to Bulgaria, the Chairman of the National Assembly, Stoicho Moshanov, departed for France and England. Thus Bulgaria looked neutral to the Great Powers although it is not difficult to predict what its choice would be at the decisive moment. Kyoseivanov was naturally very angry with what Moshanov has done because in Berlin they would have understood right away that after the visit of the Prime Minister to Germany, the Chairman of the Parliament was making insurance visits to Paris and London. At the beginning of August, a Bulgarian parliamentarian delegation visited the USSR. In this way, accidentally or not, Bulgarian politicians visited Berlin, Paris, London and Moscow in the summer of 1939. In the spring and summer of 1939, talks were held between the USSR on the one hand and England and France on the other for the conclusion of an alliance which was to act as a deterrent to the steady advance of the Nazis. In the middle of August though, these talks failed, and a pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany on August 23rd. In this way, the totalitarian systems overtook the western democracies. Bulgaria may also have contributed to the failure of the pact between Berlin and Moscow through its ambassador in Berlin, Parvan Draganov. On September 1st, the Wermacht invaded Poland. Two days later, being unable to convince Hitler to withdraw his troops, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. Later, the Red Army also took a part of the Polish territory, and the USSR and Germany signed an agreement for a new boundary between them. In the middle of September, Bulgaria declared its neutrality with respect to the military conflict. This delay is most probably because the Government wanted to understand the situation and make a correct assessment as to whether this was a local conflict or a large-scale war. There were not many options for Bulgaria at that moment. Its moves were closely observed by its neighbors who were well aware of the Bulgarian revanchist desires and who could end up in Bulgaria within hours should it not act peacefully. Thus, on September 15, 1939, Bulgaria declared its neutrality to the war that had broken out. The first months of the war were uneventful, and there were no military actions at that time. Because of this, it has been called „the strange war“, but in the spring of 1940, war became a reality. The Germans invaded on a large scale. The Wermacht occupied Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and France. This eliminated the competition for Germany on the continent. England was pushed back to its islands, and the question about Moscow was there to be solved. Italy also decided to intervene in the war and declared war on France on July 10th. In 1940, it appeared that the issue of South Dobrudzha was ripe for a solution. On June 26th, Moscow delivered an ultimatum to Bucharest: the regions of Bessarabia and North Bukovina were to be given to the USSR. At first the Romanians were inclined to resist, but after they understood that Berlin and Rome would not support them, they acquiesced, and on June 28, 1940, the Red Army advanced into these territories. On July 27th, Prime Minister Bogdan Filov, who in mid-February 1940 replaced Kyoseivanov, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivan Popov met Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop. The Germans had received the Romanian leaders a few days prior and had advised them to settle their argument with Bulgaria. After Berlin, the Romanians also visited Rome where they were given similar advice. In this way, Sofia received the support of Germany for the settlement of the South Dobrudzha issue. Yet Hitler refused to be an arbitrator between the two countries. The Romanians were forced to begin bilateral negotiations with Bulgaria. After considerable delay on the part of Romania, the Krayov Agreement was finally signed on September 7th, and South Dobrudzha was restored as a territory of Bulgaria. On September 21st, the Bulgarian army entered the restored Dobrudzha territory. A pact was signed only 20 days after the signing of the Krayov Agreement which was to play an important role in subsequent years. Japan also joined the two aggressive European forces. The signing of the trilateral pact shows that Germany had no intention of being satisfied with what it had achieved up to that moment. By the middle of October, Bulgaria’s situation had become quite delicate. Without consulting his ally in Berlin, the Italian dictator decided to manage things with Greece. Mussolini sent a letter to Tsar Boris III informing him of the actions which were under way against Bulgaria’s southern neighbor. The tone of the letter was informative, but Mussolini was hoping that the Bulgarian monarch would agree to joint actions so that Bulgaria could take its claimed territories. Unfortunately for Mussolini, the Bulgarian Tsar was too cautious to participate in such an adventure. After its initial offensive, the Italian army, which invaded Greece at the end of October, was forced by the Greek army to retreat, and Bulgaria actually helped Greece with its neutrality. In addition, in the middle of October 1940, Sofia was invited by Berlin to join the Trilateral Pact. At that time, the Tsar also received a letter from the British King expressing his satisfaction with Bulgaria’s policy, saying that this policy should continue because otherwise there was a danger of the Bulgarian territory becoming a scene for military action. The Tsar managed to get the country out of this complicated situation. Bulgaria was not misled by the Italian suggestion and remained calm with respect to its southern neighbor. The Tsar wrote a personal letter to Hitler assuring him that it was not useful for Bulgaria to join the Pact since a neutral Bulgaria could best assist the German plans. The Tsar wrote that Hitler should think well whether it was imperative for Bulgaria to join the Pact in that moment since Bulgaria’s recent policy had kept the Bulgarian and German enemies at bay. Tsar Boris and Minister Popov make a visit to Hitler and von Ribbentrop on November 17, 1940. They talked about Bulgaria eventually joining the Pact. Hitler behaved well with the Bulgarian monarch, which was not true of von Ribbentrop who treated the Bulgarian Foreign Minister quite unceremoniously. Von Ribbentrop wanted Popov to agree that Bulgaria would sign the Pact, but Popov stood up for his position heroically. According to Genchev’s thesis, Bulgaria refused to join the Pact not on principle but only postponed joining until a later date. According to him, the fact that the German army had yet to reach the Danube combined with the threat coming from Turkey, the unpredictable conduct of Yugoslavia and the British threats were the reasons that the Bulgarian leaders rejected signing the contract. Mihov theorized that German military specialists had been installed in Bulgaria as early as mid-October. He also thought that the suggestion for a pact on the part of the USSR and Arkady Sobolev’s visit to Sofia prevented „the attachment of Bulgaria to the chariot of Nazi Germany“. Mihov expressed his conviction that England also suspected that Bulgaria would enter into the Pact, especially judging from King George’s letter to Tsar Boris. As a whole, his thesis is that talks were being held to unify all possible forces against the USSR. According to Dimitrov, Tsar Boris had not rejected joining the Pact on principle, but instead had asked for a delay and had also declared that he would like Yugoslavia to follow the same path. According to Hitler, Turkey would not dare invade Bulgaria if the latter joined the Pact. The Tsar went to the meeting with Hitler accompanied by Popov instead of Filov in order to evade making decisions in Bergtesgarden. The Tsar told Hitler that the road to Thessaloniki for the Wermacht would be shorter if they passed through the Vardar Valley and not through Bulgaria. According to Stefan Gruev, „The Tsar did not say ‘no’ but rather said ‘not now’.“ According to the same author, five days later Ambassador Draganov passed to Hitler the answer of the Bulgarian Government which agreed in principle to enter the pact but at a later stage. In my opinion, the Tsar agreed to Bulgaria joining the Trilateral Pact but managed to get the delay he was seeking, namely at the time the German troops reached the border of his country. This would give Bulgaria the security it was striving for because, if there were Wermacht troops on Bulgarian territory, none of Bulgaria’s neighbors would think of contradicting its decision to join the Pact. The Tsar did not have much of a choice because he either had to choose the German alternative or simply expose the country to a quite unclear future. Vyacheslav Molotov made a visit to Hitler on November 12th. During the visit, the Soviet diplomat expressed the wish of the USSR to give Bulgaria guarantees similar to those Germany gave Romania where Nazi troops were installed at the beginning of October. Hitler asked if the Bulgarian Tsar had requested such guarantees as the Romanian leaders had. After the meeting between Boris and Hitler on November 19th in Bergtesgarden, the Soviet Government delivered to Ivan Stamenov, the Bulgarian Ambassador in Moscow, an offer to sign a pact of mutual assistance. A year earlier, Georgi Kyoseivanov, simultaneously the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, rejected a similar offer declaring that the time had not come for the signing of such a pact. According to Dekanozov, Molotov’s deputy, now was the right time for the signing of a pact. Such pacts were also signed with the Baltic states in the summer of 1940, after which they were annexed into the USSR. Given the nature of the Government in Moscow which did not tolerate any monarchical form of government, as well as a fear that Bulgaria would become ‘Balticized’, the Tsar and the strong four members of the cabinet, namely Prime Minister Bogdan Filov, Foreign Minister Ivan Popov, Minister of Defense Teodosi Daskalov and Minister of Interior Petar Gabrovski, categorically rejected the offer.

On November 23rd, Popov sent an answer to Stamenov, saying that Bulgaria did not feel threatened and that no guarantees were necessary. It also said that Bulgaria had been invited to enter the Trilateral Pact and was studying this offer. The Soviet diplomat Arkadi Sobolev arrived in Sofia on November 24th. The purpose of his visit was to deliver the draft agreement between Moscow and Sofia. The next day the Communists made public the text of the Pact and a movement was started in its defense. Moscow had no objections to military guarantees being omitted with Moscow being the only one giving such guarantees to Sofia. The USSR had nothing against Bulgaria joining the Trilateral Pact. Possibly the USSR itself might enter the Pact at a later stage. The USSR acknowledged Bulgaria’s territorial aspirations. After a conversation with the Soviet leaders Yosif Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov, Dimitrov sent a telegram to the Bulgarian Communists instructing them to start a large scale propaganda campaign for the acceptance of the Soviet offer of a pact. The Bulgarian Communists undertook large-scale activities to popularize the Soviet offer. Some members of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (BWP) were not well briefed on the general situation, and in their opinion England was still the instigator of the war. The BWP proclaimed that signing a pact with the USSR would not lead to balticization or bolshevization of the country. In spite of all maneuvers by the Tsar, Bulgaria was forced to define its position at the beginning of 1941. Filov met with von Ribbentrop and Hitler to discuss Bulgaria’s inclusion in the Trilateral Pact. Germany promised the White Sea region as a territorial acquisition for Bulgaria. A Bulgarian-Turkish declaration on non-aggression was declared „publicly“ in Ankara and in Sofia on February 17th. This declaration was signed with the knowledge of Berlin, and with this step, the Bulgarian Government secured Turkey’s neutrality concerning Bulgaria’s inclusion in the Pact, which was under way. The members of the delegation who were to leave for the signing of the contract, were changed because of Popov’s supposed illness. On principle, he was skeptical about Bulgaria joining the Pact, however he did not resign and decided instead to feign illness so that he would not have to go to Vienna. Bulgarian Prime Minister Filov, the head of the Bulgarian delegation in Vienna, signed a protocol joining Bulgaria to the Trilateral Pact on March 1st at 13.30 o’clock. On the part of the Axis, the protocol was signed by von Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Count Chano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy and Japanese Ambassador Oshima. On the next day, Bulgaria’s inclusion in the Trilateral Pact was ratified by the Governmental majority with a „loud ovation“. The members of Parliament in the opposition were not given an opportunity to express their protest. The entry of the German army into Bulgaria began on March 1st. After Bulgaria joined the Trilateral Pact, Moscow expressed its disapproval, and England broke off diplomatic relations with Sofia on March 5th. Genchev described three possible options for action which Bulgaria had on the eve of the signing of the pact. Option one was for Bulgaria to render military resistance to the Wermacht. This option would have been disastrous for Bulgaria since as it became clear only a month later, far better equipped armies capitulated to Germany within days. Option number two was for Bulgaria not to joint the pact and not to render resistance to the advancing Wermacht troops. The risk in this case was to create chaos in the country when the governing faction might be replaced by extreme supporters of the Reich. Option three was the one chosen by Bulgaria — to join the Pact. This option was the most suitable at that moment. England promised to help Bulgaria if it resisted Germany, but these promises were not well-grounded because England itself was suffering great difficulties and could not exit its islands. According to Sirkov there was also another possibility for Bulgaria besides those described by Genchev. This was the possibility of signing a pact with the USSR which in the opinion of the author would have made it difficult for Germany to have pursued its aggressive actions. The author rejects the possibility that Germany moved to the Balkans mainly because of the war between Italy and Greece. In his opinion, even if there were no such war, Germany would have advanced towards the peninsula. The parameters of an eventual pact between Sofia and Moscow were also of importance. It was some hours before the Wermacht invaded Yugoslavia that a pact was signed between the USSR and Yugoslavia which did not influence in any way Germany’s aggression. It is written in volume two of „The History of Bulgaria“ published in 1955 that the Bulgarian leaders entered into an agreement with Germany to join the Trilateral Pact as early as the autumn of 1940. Generally speaking, the Bulgarian Government at that time did not have many alternatives. Genchev defines three options while Sirkov adds a fourth one. Maybe the most correct decision is the one made by the Bulgarian leaders, namely for Bulgaria to join the aggressor’s pact but to evade participation in military operations. Of course, the option involving armed resistance to the Wermacht is only theoretical since the Bulgarian army was too weak and poorly armed in comparison to the German army. In the second place, why would Bulgaria oppose Germany? Germany was the primary advocate for changes in the demands of the Versailles Treaty when at the same time Bulgaria was trying to revise the Neuilly Treaty. Therefore it appears there was no well-grounded reason for Bulgaria to render military resistance to Germany. The above said, one should not ignore the Germanophile attitude of the Government which was in power at that time and especially that of Prime Minister Filov. The next option which can also be defined as purely theoretical was for Bulgaria not to join the Trilateral Pact and not render resistance to Germany for allowing the Wermacht to pass through the territory of the country. This was also impossible because the governing faction would have been threatened by an eventual change, and rulers who were extremist supporters of Berlin could replace it. Besides, if this option were to be used, Bulgaria could not expect any solution to its territorial claims. The next theoretical option would have been for Bulgaria to have signed an agreement with Moscow and in this way evade the German advancement through its territory. Yet where is the guarantee that Germany would stop had such a pact been signed? Even if this were the case, there were still no favorable grounds for narrow cooperation between Bulgaria and the USSR. The Tsar was terrified of a communist system that rejected the monarchy. So, if the rulers wanted to maintain their positions, there were no options to reach an agreement between the two countries. Also, the example of the Baltic states was too recent for the rulers in Sofia to consider a more serious rapprochement with Moscow. Considering the options above, perhaps the most advantageous for Bulgaria and the rulers in Sofia was the option which was finally chosen — to join the Trilateral Pact and align the country with the camp of the revisionist countries which had already acquired the appearance of aggressors.

On March 25th, Cvetkovich’s Government annexed Yugoslavia into the Trilateral Pact which is what Bulgaria had wanted to happen. Two days later, General Simovich carried out a coup d’etat in Belgrade. Hitler undertook immediate action. As early as the evening of March 27th, he signed Directive 25 for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Bulgaria and Hungary were to be drawn into the military action by means of territorial concessions. Ambassador Draganov in Berlin was summoned on the same day to a meeting with Hitler and von Ribbentrop. The latter stated that the new situation brought forward the issue of Macedonia. On April 6th, the Wermacht advanced on Yugoslavia and Greece and eliminated their armies in a matter of days. The armies of Bulgaria’s two neighbors had not had any military limitations imposed upon them after the First World War and, in spite of this, they were crushed quickly and uncompromisingly by the German military machine. What would have happened to Bulgaria had the rulers in Sofia eventually decided to render military resistance to the German army? On April 19th, Germany gave a green light to Sofia, and the Bulgarian army entered the newly liberated territories. The White Sea region was given to Bulgaria as compensation for its entry into the Trilateral Pact. The issue of Vardar, Macedonia was suddenly solved primarily because of Serbia’s relationship with Germany. Had Yugoslavia remained loyal to Germany, this painful issue for Bulgaria would not have been solved in such a way. Germany had no intention of satisfying Bulgaria at the expense of Yugoslavia, but after the latter betrayed the Trilateral Pact, Berlin decided to punish severely Bulgaria’s western neighbor. Continuous friction with the Italians started in Macedonia. Italy wanted more of the territory of Macedonia to annex to the territory of Albania. On June 22nd Hitler made a gross blunder when he attacked the USSR without having dealt with England. In „The History of Bulgaria“, volume three, published in 1964, Stalin, who had made unilateral decisions on all important state and military issues, is blamed for the advance of the Wermacht and the lack of readiness on the part of the Red Army. Germany believed that the war against the USSR would end quickly. Yet, German plans proved wrong. The blitzkrieg failed and at the beginning of December, the invincible Wermacht was defeated near Moscow. In the early morning of December 7, 1941, the Japanese air force attacked the American military base at Pearl Harbor. On December 8th, the USA declared war on Japan. England joined after that. On December 11th, Germany accused the USA of having broken its neutrality, and in this way war was declared. Berlin was supported by Rome. With the Japanese declaration of war on the USA, Germany demanded that the member countries of the Trilateral Pact enter the war on the side of Japan. On December 12th, the Bulgarian Government made the disastrous decision to declare war on the USA and England. According to Bulgaria’s rulers, this was a „symbolic war“. The next day, the majority in the National Assembly approved the decision of the Government. At the end of 1941, Germany wanted Bulgaria to send three military divisions to occupy Moravia. The Government agreed to that, thinking that in this way it could evade larger obligations. Berlin did not want to resolve Bulgaria’s territorial issues since it was more convenient for them to keep Bulgaria at bay in order to submit more easily to German demands. The political map of „The Danube Area“ was published in Germany, which referred to April 1942. On this map, the territories of Macedonia and Thrace, annexed to Bulgaria, were given only for the Bulgarian Government to administer; the borders were marked as temporary. In April 1942, the Tsar made changes in the Government. The indecisive Foreign Minister Popov was removed from the Government and the other essential change was to replace the Minister of Defense General Teodosi Daskalov with General Nikola Mihov. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was taken over by Filov who also kept his post as Prime Minister. These changes were made after the Tsar visited Hitler. It is not certain whether Hitler suggested the changes in the Government. It is possible that the Tsar wanted to present the changes as such, made under German influence. Bulgaria managed to save its Jewish population, but only, it should be noted, those Jews living within the old boundaries of the country. The Jewish population from the newly annexed territories were subjected to extermination. Perhaps the most important role in the salvation of the Jews within the old boundaries of the country was played in March 1943 by the Vice Chairman of Parliament, Dimitar Peshev, who wrote a letter of protest. This letter was signed by more than 40 members of Parliament. Peshev hardly ever acted without the knowledge of the palace. However, despite the Government’s censure of the letter and the refusal of some parliamentarians to sign the letter, this was successful in saving the lives of more than 8000 Bulgarian Jews, unlike their fellow-Jews from the newly annexed territories who were taken by Bulgarian trains to the Danube River where they were handed over to the Germans. The colossal Battle for Stalingrad ended between the end of January and the beginning of February 1943. The Soviet counter-offensive which began on November 19, 1942, led to the encirclement of a large number German troops. The success of the Red Army led to the capture of more than 91,000 Germans. The Battle for Stalingrad was in actual fact the turning point of the war. From this point on, the Wermacht started slowly but surely losing its positions and retreating. Bulgarian Prime Minister Filov defined the lost battle more as a psychological defeat, not attaching to it any special military importance. By the end of 1942, both the Romanians and the Hungarians began thinking of making a separate peace with the Allies. They suggested that Italy take part in this action as well, but Mussolini refused to do it. Chano, who felt disposed to this idea, was removed from the post of Foreign Minister together with the remaining „defeatist“ ministers. The landing of British and American troops on the island of Sicily began on July 10th, and on July 25th, Victor Emanuel replaced Mussolini with Pietro Badoglio. The unconditional surrender of Italy was signed in September. Hitler decided to help his ally. Mussolini was freed by the Germans, and on September 23rd, he took his place at the head of the newly created Italian Social Republic situated in northern and central Italy.

On September 27th, Germany demanded that its satellites acknowledge the newly-created republic. The Bulgarian Government acknowledged the republic, but at the same time it did not break its relations with the royal government. On the morning of August 14th, Tsar Boris flew to Germany and returned on the afternoon of August 15th. This was the third time the Tsar had visited Hitler in that year. The same evening, Filov had an audience with the Tsar, who was not pleased with his visit to Germany. Several days after his return from his meeting with Hitler, the Tsar fell ill. Specialists were called from Berlin and Vienna, but the Tsar’s health deteriorated, and he died on the afternoon of August 28th. At first the Tsar’s illness was kept secret, and only on August 26th was an official communiqué issued, saying that the Tsar was ill. The death of the Tsar and especially the fact that it followed a meeting with Hitler has given rise to different opinions among historians and others. Yet, there is no proof for any of the speculation. Some claim that prior to falling into a coma, the Tsar said that he had fought with Hitler to protect Bulgaria. Others speculate that the Tsar was poisoned — but who did it? Some say he was poisoned by the Germans, others by the English and yet others by the Russian. Where there are no clear facts, the fantasies of some writers are unleashed and they manage to arrange the puzzle in ways that are logical to them. Yet, it is a fact that the death of the Tsar did not change the attitude of Bulgaria toward Germany. Could the Tsar have been eliminated by the Germans for wanting to break away from the German ship which was sinking slowly but surely? This is hardly possible because Germany was still too strong and the Tsar too careful to risk subjecting the country to German occupation. At that moment in the USSR, they would have hardly thought of eliminating the Bulgarian Tsar whose death would not have changed the situation in any way. The same can be said about England as well. It was necessary to reconstruct the leadership of the country after the death of the Tsar. The child Simeon could not govern the country alone, and according to the Constitution, a Regency Council had to be elected. Filov, who became the most powerful man in the country after the death of the Tsar, Prince Kiril and General Mihov were elected to be regents. Constituted in this way, the regency violated two points of the Constitution. First, the regents should have been elected by a Great National Assembly and not by an ordinary National Assembly as was the case. Second, Prince Kiril did not have the right to be a regent because he was a member of the royal family and had not held any of the posts named in the Constitution which were a requisite to being named a regent. The Minister of Finance at that time, Dobri Bozhilov, became Prime Minister. This state of affairs did not assume any changes in the foreign policy of the country, but it should be mentioned that there were no extreme Germanophiles in the Government who could have brought the country even closer to Germany which was losing the war slowly but surely. A new danger threatened Bulgaria in the autumn of 1943. The Allies began devastating bombings which terrorized the country because peaceful communities and civilian sites were being targeted. The most massive bombardment was the one that took place on January 10, 1944. A number of diplomatic notes were delivered to the Bulgarian Government by Moscow in April and May 1944. The USSR asserted that Bulgarian airports and sea ports were being used by the German army. These allegations were rejected by the Government. After that the USSR asked for the restoration of the Soviet Consulate in Varna and for the opening of Consular offices in Burgas and Ruse, but the Government set a pre-condition of developing economic relations between the USSR and Bulgaria. In actual fact, the Soviet diplomatic notes in April and May 1944 led to the fall of the Bozhilov Government. The new cabinet was headed by Ivan Bagryanov, who thought he could communicate equally well with Moscow and Berlin. On June 6th, the situation for Germany became even more unstable. England and the USA finally opened a second front against the Wermacht in France. At the end of July, the new Government agreed to restore the Soviet Consulate in Varna, whose consular district included Varna, Ruse and Burgas. If this Government had the goal of preparing for a change in Bulgarian foreign policy and extricating itself from a pact with the losing camp, its actions were too indecisive. On the other hand, the possibilities for this were slight since there were still German troops in Bulgaria. Yet the Government made a decision and in August sent to Turkey the former Chairman of the 24th National Assembly, Stoycho Moshanov, who was to contact the Allies and learn under what conditions Bulgaria could exit the war. The development of subsequent events went lightening fast. Romania capitulated on August 23rd and the Red Army landed on the Danube. On August 26th, the Government declared neutrality in the war between Germany and the USSR and announced that it was in contact with the countries with which Bulgaria was in a state of war. The regents prepare themselves to form a new Government which was to be formed from among the opposition. The leader of the Agrarian Union, Konstantin Muraviev, became Prime Minister and had to form a cabinet of a national coalition, i.e. all opposition entities had to enter the Government. But the Communists refused to enter Muraviev’s Government. On September 2nd, Muraviev presented the new Government to the regents. The USSR declared war on Bulgaria on September 5th. With this act, Moscow found a way for the Red Army to invade Bulgaria. The same day, the Government broke its relations with Germany and decided to seek a truce with the Soviet Union. The Government decided to declare war on Germany, but for military reasons the decision did not take effect until September 8th. Domestic protests took place on September 6th, 7th and 8th. Jails were broken into and political prisoners were set free. Workers went on strike. A miners’ strike in Pernik began on September 7th and escalated. The Bulgarian Communists overthrew Muraviev’s Government on the night of September 9th and replaced it with a Government of the Fatherland Front. Kimon Georgiev from Zveno became Prime Minister. One can find different explanations in the Bulgarian historic literature as to how the Fatherland Front came to power. In the so-called Marxist historiography, these events were defined as a people’s uprising and a revolution, while in the historiography after 1989, we encounter the word ‘coup’ as well. No matter how one calls the event on September 9, 1944 — an uprising, a revolution, a coup, pronunciamento, putsch, or whatever — the fact is that this was a change that determined the history of Bulgaria for four and a half decades. On September 9th, an historic, social and economic order was replaced by a radically different one. This change became possible not because it was imposed by the Bulgarian Communists, but because the Great Powers had agreed that Bulgaria would be within the Soviet sphere of influence. The new Government was composed in violation of the Constitution and the new regency appointed by the Government of the Fatherland Front was also in violation of the Constitution although hardly anyone was interested at that time. The Bulgarian army was incorporated into the structure of the Third Ukrainian Front, and an agreement was signed between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on October 5th in Krayova which declared that the Bulgarian troops operating inside Yugoslavia were there to help expel the Germans and were not considered invaders. After the USSR declared war on Bulgaria, the issue of signing an armistice acquired a new aspect. Moshanov, who had been in Cairo since the end of August for talks with the British and the Americans, returned to Bulgaria because his mission had ended and Moscow was designated as the new location for holding talks. The armistice between Bulgaria and the Allies was signed in Moscow on October 28, 1944. Bulgarian troops were evacuated from the White Sea region, and Bulgaria entered the war against Germany. This is how the participation of Bulgaria in the so-called Patriotic War began during which many Bulgarians were killed. Yet these victims certainly contributed to a more favorable situation for the country after the end of the war with Germany. Bulgarian foreign policy on the eve of and during the Second World War is an issue of continuing interest to historians. This is undoubtedly one of the most interesting periods in Bulgaria’s new history. The Bulgarian historiography during the first two decades after the war does not make a real evaluation of the situation of the country and the conduct of its rulers. It is later that historical works appear, making a more objective evaluation of Bulgarian foreign policy in the years of the Second World War. Diaries and memoirs of participants in these events were published after the political change that took place in 1989. Unfortunately, there were research works published that pretend to be objective but which were dominated by anti-communist rhetoric. The authors of those works may have thought that in this way they would more quickly find their place in the sun of history. Yet, one is a true historian when one strives to present events objectively to a maximum degree.

In the 1950’s and 60’s, Bulgarian historians presented the role of the USSR and of Bulgarian Communists in a most favorable light while the merits of the rulers of the country and of the allies of the USSR were criticized and their mistakes exaggerated. Research was published later in which a professional historic approach prevailed over the Party approach, although not completely eliminated. Bulgaria could not afford to follow its own foreign political line during the Second World War because its status quo was defined 20 years earlier with the signing of the Neuilly Treaty by force of which age-old Bulgarian territories were taken from Bulgaria. The Treaty also imposed harsh reparations on Bulgaria. What brought about these demands is another question, but the victorious countries severely punished the countries that lost the First World War which laid the basis for the next devastating military conflict. In the period between the two world wars, the victorious countries made no effort to draw Bulgaria to their side. They supported Bulgaria’s neighbors which were ready at any moment to deal with their weak neighbor should it show any signs of revanchism. It is hardly strange under these circumstances that the Bulgarian rulers saw the only beam of hope in the face of Germany which also lost the First World War and was punished by England and France. Yet, Germany was a great power, while Bulgaria was not. For this reason Bulgaria had to assess carefully each move it made. Bulgaria’s foreign policy, which became more and more oriented toward Germany, seems quite reasonable. If England and France did not wish to win over Bulgaria to their side and the rulers in Sofia excluded rapprochement with the USSR, then the only way out was to ally with Germany. It is namely through Germany that Bulgaria sought a resolution of its claims. The Bulgarian rulers headed by Tsar Boris III were exceptionally careful not to make a wrong step and draw the country into the war. Coincidentally or not, Bulgarian politicians visited Berlin, Moscow, Paris and London in the summer of 1939. Only a year later Bulgaria got back South Dobrudzha by peaceful means. Bulgaria received this territory from Germany, not from the USSR or England, which also acknowledged Bulgaria’s just demands. This is perhaps the most telling evidence that Bulgaria wanted to follow Germany and not any other Great Power. But even if Bulgaria’s wish were different, it would have been impossible to realize because England could hardly breathe from the German attacks and the Tsar did not want to hear anything about the USSR. He knew quite well what had happened to his godfather, the last Russian Tsar after the October Revolution.

The Bulgarian rulers managed during the war to prevent Bulgaria from becoming a battleground, and if it were not for the misguided decision of the rulers to declare war on England and the USA, Bulgaria could have avoided the devastating bombardments in 1943–1944.

For its role as a German satellite, Bulgaria received the territories it had justly claimed. Yet, Germany did not want to solve Bulgaria’s territorial issues. It preferred to keep the Bulgarian rulers at bay by giving Bulgaria the new territories to administer only with the intention of redrawing the borders after the end of the war. One can only guess if Bulgaria would have been satisfied then with respect to all its claims. Keeping in mind that it was not playing its role of a satellite exactly as they would have liked in Berlin, I doubt that the Germans would have agreed to all Bulgarian territorial claims.

The turning point of the war in 1943 cooled the enthusiasm of the Bulgarian pro-German politicians, and the death of Tsar Boris confused them still more since it happened after a visit to Hitler, giving grounds for rumors of a forced death. On their part, the Germans also spread versions about the death of the Tsar. Consequently, there are doubts about his death even today. Known historic materials give grounds to draw the conclusion that the death of Tsar Boris was most probably natural and the result of a still more complicated situation. The Tsar, who had always kept to the policy of maneuvering and waiting, understood that Germany was gradually but surely losing the war. Bulgaria was inevitably to follow it, making the road to salvation seem more and more impossible to travel. It is most probably this conclusion and the great tension that led to the death of the Tsar. It is difficult to say what his fate would have been had he lived to the time of the radical change that took place on September 9, 1944.

The Bulgarian Communists who made the political, social and economic changes on September 9th can take no practical credit for this change. Bulgaria turned out to be a pawn of the Great Powers which predetermined its fate for the ensuing four and a half decades by deciding that Bulgaria would be within the Soviet sphere of influence. This period is subject to strenuous research on the part of historians and is evaluated in contradictory ways. Future historians will give the most correct evaluation of the regime after 1944. The Bulgarian army contributed to the defeat of Nazism, and the tens of thousands of killed and wounded Bulgarian warriors allowed for more favorable treatment of the country after the end of the war. Bulgaria even retained South Dobrudzha — a territory it acquired months before its entry into the Trilateral Pact. This territory was conceded by Romania which at the end of the war was also a defeated German satellite. What would have been the situation concerning this piece of land had Romania been on the side of the Allies?

In my opinion, during the Second World War Bulgaria had a reasonable foreign policy considering there were not many alternatives. Naturally, I do not deny in any way that the rulers had pro-German inclinations and strong anti-Soviet feelings. They could not have avoided Bulgaria’s inclusion in the Trilateral Pact, but it was not necessary to make the big mistake of declaring war on Great Britain and the USA. It is quite questionable whether Bulgaria could have left the German orbit earlier. If it had made a more decisive attempt to do this in the spring and summer of 1944, this could have cost the country dearly. The Germans would have hardly hesitated to replace the members of the Government by extreme supporters of the Third Reich.

During the years of the Second World War, Bulgaria attempted to develop a reasonable foreign policy, but we should not underestimate the fact that it is a small country and that it is among the countries which lost the First World War. Had it not been for the blunder of the rulers in December 1941, the country could have avoided the destructive bombardments by the Allies.